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In this paper we propose a methodology to inject 
realistic attacks in web applications. The methodology is 
based on the idea that by injecting realistic 
vulnerabilities in a web application and attacking them 
automatically we can assess existing security 
mechanisms. To provide true to life results, this 
methodology relies on field studies of a large number of 
vulnerabilities in web applications. The paper also 
describes a set of tools implementing the proposed 
methodology. They allow the automation of the entire 
process, including gathering results and analysis. We 
used these tools to conduct a set of experiments to 
demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the 
proposed methodology. The experiments include the 
evaluation of coverage and false positives of an Intrusion 
Detection System for SQL Injection and the assessment of 
the effectiveness of two Web Application Vulnerability 
Scanners. Results show that the injection of 
vulnerabilities and attacks is an effective way to evaluate 




There is an increasing dependency on web applications 
nowadays, ranging from individuals to large 
organizations. Almost everything is stored, available or 
traded on the web. Web applications can be personal web 
sites, blogs, news, social networks, webmails, bank 
agencies, forums, e-commerce applications, etc. The 
omnipresence of web applications in our way of life and 
in our economy is so important that they are a natural 
target for malicious minds. 
Security motivation of web applications should reflect 
the magnitude and relevance of the assets they are 
supposed to protect. Although there is an increasing 
concern about security (often being subject to regulations 
from governments and corporations), there are some 
significant factors that make securing web applications a 
task hard to fulfill: 
• The web application market is growing fast, resulting 
in a huge proliferation of web applications, largely 
fueled by the (apparent) simplicity one can develop 
and maintain such applications; 
• Web applications are highly exposed to attacks; 
• It is common to find developers and administrators of 
web applications without the required knowledge or 
experience in the area of security. 
Not surprisingly, the overall situation of security in 
web applications is quite favorable to attacks [1, 2, 3]. In 
fact, estimations point to a very large number of web 
applications with security vulnerabilities [4, 5] and 
consequently, there are numerous reports of successful 
security breaches and exploitations [6, 7]. To fight this 
scenario we need means to evaluate the security of web 
applications and attack counter measure tools. 
In this paper we address the security of web 
applications by applying a procedure inspired on the fault 
injection technique that has been used for decades in the 
dependability area. In our case, the “security 
vulnerability” + “attack” represents the space of the 
“faults” we inject in a web application; and the 
“intrusion” is the “error” [8, 9]. To emulate with accuracy 
real world web vulnerabilities we rely on results obtained 
from a field study on real security vulnerabilities [10] and 
use them in a novel Vulnerability Injection tool. This tool 
is, in fact, a key instrument that can be used in several 
relevant scenarios: 
• Building block of a realistic Attack Injector. An 
Attack Injector can be a valuable tool to test various 
counter measure mechanisms, such as Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS), Firewalls, Web Application 
Vulnerability Scanners, etc. Conceptually, an attack 
injection tool consists of the injection of realistic 
vulnerabilities that are automatically attacked, and 
finally the result of the attack is evaluated. To verify 
the success of the attack we need to analyze the flux of 
information inside the application by placing probes 
strategically, in the least intrusive way. The analysis of 
the results of these probes and their synchronism with 
the attack are key elements of the Attack Injector; 
• Train security teams. By injecting representative 
security vulnerabilities in web application code, we 
provide a realistic test bed for the training of security 
teams that are going to perform code inspection and 
penetration testing [11]; 
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• Evaluate security teams. In a controlled environment, 
security teams can be assessed based on the number of 
vulnerabilities they are able to find, the number of 
false positives reported and the time needed to perform 
a set of code inspections and penetration tests; 
• Estimate the total number of vulnerabilities still 
present in the code. The injection of realistic 
vulnerabilities in web code can help decide if the 
software is ready to be released or not. The process 
consists of injecting vulnerabilities and having a 
security team searching for them. The team will most 
likely find some of the injected vulnerabilities and 
some that already existed in the code. The estimated 
number of vulnerabilities still present in the software 
can be obtained from the percentage of those injected 
that were found and those not injected that were also 
found, using an approach similar to the one proposed 
by Steve McConnell for software bugs in general [12]. 
In this paper, we present a Vulnerability Injection 
tool and an Attack Injection tool for web applications, 
which implement our vulnerability and attack injection 
methodology. We have implemented these tools and 
tested them with widely used applications in two case 
study scenarios. The first goal of our experiments is to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the Vulnerability Injection 
tool in producing a large number of realistic 
vulnerabilities. The second goal is to show how the 
Attack Injection tool can exploit injected vulnerabilities 
to launch attacks, allowing the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of counter measure mechanisms installed in 
the target system. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next section 
presents related research. Section 3 introduces the Attack 
Injection architecture. Section 4 describes the 
experiments and discusses the results. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Fault injection techniques have been largely used to 
evaluate fault tolerant systems [13, 14]. The artificial 
injection of a large quantity of faults in a system or in a 
component of the system speeds up the occurrence of 
faults and errors, allowing researchers and engineers to 
evaluate the impact of faults on the system and/or 
potential error propagation to other systems. Fault 
injection also helps in estimating fault tolerant system 
measures, such as the fault coverage and error latency 
[13]. 
Fault injection techniques have traditionally been used 
to inject physical (i.e., hardware) faults [13, 14].  In fact, 
initial fault injection techniques used hardware-based 
approaches such as pin-level injection or heavy-ion 
radiation. The increased complexity of systems has lead 
to the replacement of hardware-based techniques by 
software implemented fault injection (SWIFI), in which 
hardware faults are emulated by software. Xception [15] 
and NFTAPE [16] are examples of SWIFI tools.  
The injection of realistic software faults (i.e., software 
bugs) has been absent from fault injection effort for a 
long time. First proposals were based on ad-hoc code 
mutations [17, 18] but more recent proposals allow the 
injection of representative software faults based on 
comprehensive field studies on the most common types of 
software bugs [19]. 
The use of fault injection techniques to assess security 
is actually a particular case of software fault injection, 
focused on the software faults that represent security 
vulnerabilities or may cause the system to fail in avoiding 
a security problem. Neves et. al. presented a tool 
(AJECT) focusing on the discovery of vulnerabilities on 
network servers, specifically on IMAP servers [9]. In 
their work the fault space is the binomial (attack, 
vulnerability) creating an intrusion that will cause an 
error and, possibly, a failure of the target system. To 
attack the target system they used predefined test classes 
of attacks and some sort of fuzzing. 
In the industry, fuzzing techniques allied to the 
signature of known attacks and vulnerabilities are used to 
automate the penetration testing of web applications and 
web services. These tools, called Web Application 
Vulnerability Scanners, perform security testing and 
assessment, producing reports compliant with many 
security regulations (Sarbanes-Oxley, Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard compliance, etc.) that 
apply to web applications. Some of the best known are 
the HP WebInspect 7.7, the IBM Watchfire AppScan 7.0, 
the Acunetix web application security scanner, the 
WebSphinx, among others. In spite of their continuous 
development, these automated scanners still have some 
problems related to the high number of undetected 
vulnerabilities and high percentage of false positives [20]. 
Another contribution to better understand the most 
common vulnerabilities in web applications was 
presented in a field study that classified 655 Cross Site 
Scripting (XSS) and SQL Injection security patches of six 
widely used LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL and PHP) 
web applications [10]. One major conclusion of this study 
is that the most common type of vulnerabilities in web 
application code is by far, the “Missing Function Call – 
extended” (MFCE) that can be expanded into three sub-
types (see Table 1). This fault type represents 
vulnerabilities caused by an input variable that should 
have been properly sanitized by a specific function 
(which the programmer forgot to include in the code). 
Table 1 shows that sub-type A, which is originated by 
unchecked numeric fields, is the most relevant. This 
result is also corroborated by another study, this time 
referring only to SQL injection vulnerabilities found in 
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BugTraq SecurityFocus and presented by the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) [21]. This study 
concludes that about half of the SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities come from exploitation of numeric fields. 
The methodology proposed in the present paper relies 
on the results of the already mentioned field studies [10, 
21] to define the types of vulnerabilities to be injected 
(fault models), which match the most common types of 
vulnerabilities found in web applications in the field. 
 
3. Vulnerability and attack injection 
approaches 
 
In this paper we present a methodology that can be 
used to test important security mechanisms applied to 
web applications. The methodology is based on the 
injection of realistic vulnerabilities and subsequent 
controlled exploit of the vulnerabilities to attack the 
system. This provides a practical environment that can be 
used to test counter measure mechanisms (such as IDS, 
Web Application Vulnerability Scanners, Firewalls, etc.), 
train and evaluate security teams, estimate security 
measures (like the number of vulnerabilities present in the 
code), among others. 
To provide a realistic environment we must deal with 
true to life vulnerabilities. As mentioned previously, we 
rely on the results from field studies [10, 21], particularly 
from the study presented in [10] that classified 655 
security patches of six widely used LAMP web 
applications. With this data, we are able to define where a 
real vulnerability is usually located in the source code, 
what is the difference between a vulnerable and a non-
vulnerable piece of code, and sometimes how the 
vulnerability manifests itself. 
The injection is done by means of an automated tool: 
the Vulnerability Injection tool. The second element of 
the methodology, the attack of the vulnerability, is done 
by the Attack Injection tool. In fact, the Attack Injection 
tool also seamlessly integrates the Vulnerability Injection 
tool and both tools do their work as one, in an automated 
fashion. 
The Vulnerability Injection tool is used to inject 
vulnerabilities in a web application source code file 
(Figure 1). It starts by analyzing the source code of the 
target file searching for locations where vulnerabilities 
can be injected. It follows the realistic patterns resulting 
from the field study [10]. Once it finds a possible 
location, it performs a specific code mutation in order to 
inject one vulnerability in that particular location. The 
change in the code follows the rules derived from [10], 
which are described and implemented by a set of 
Vulnerability Operators [11]. As a result, we obtain the 
original file with a single vulnerability injected. This 
procedure can be automatically repeated until all the 
locations where realistic vulnerabilities can be injected 
are identified and all the corresponding vulnerabilities are 
injected, resulting in a set of files, each one with one 
possible vulnerability. 
The Vulnerability Operators are built upon a pair of 
attributes: the Location Pattern and the Vulnerability 
Code Change. The Location Pattern defines the 
conditions that a specific vulnerability type must comply 
with and the Vulnerability Code Change specifies the 
actions that must be performed to inject this vulnerability, 
depending on the environment where the vulnerability is 
going to be injected. In order to clarify the concept of 
Vulnerability Operator, let us analyze the following 
example [11]. One of the Location Pattern restrictions for 
the MFCE - A sub-type, is the search for the “intval()”1 
PHP function when the argument is related to an input 
value from the outside and the result is going to be used 
in a SQL query string. Consider, for example this code: 
“$id=intval($_GET[‘id’]);”. If the variable “$id” is going 
to be used in a query, then the Vulnerability Code Change 
consisted of removing this function from the source code 
in order to inject a vulnerability. As can be seen, by 
removing the function we get “$id=$_GET [‘id’];”, which 
can be vulnerable to an SQL injection attack. For 
example, by assigning the value “15 or 1=1” to the “$id” 
variable, the SQL query is going to execute without the 
effect of the “where” condition, therefore affecting every 
row of the query, which was not intended by the 
developer of the application.  
The automated attack of a web application with one 
vulnerability injected is done by the Attack Injection tool, 
in two stages. In the first stage, the web application is 
interacted (crawled) while both the HTTP and SQL 
communications are captured and processed by the tool. 
In the second stage (the attack stage, shown in Figure 2), 
a new interaction with the web application is performed 
but, this time, a collection of attack payloads is also 
applied in order to exploit the vulnerability by altering the 
SQL query sent to the database server of the web 
                                                 
1 The “intval()” PHP function returns the integer value of the argument. 
Table 1. Missing Function Call - extended sub-types [10]
Sub-type SQL (%)* Description 
A 64.25 Missing casting to numeric of onevariable 
B 4.15 Missing assignment of one variable to a custom made function 
C 4.15 Missing assignment of one variable toa PHP predefined function 
* The values are referred to all the SQL Injection vulnerabilities analyzed in the field study [10] 
 
Figure 1: The Vulnerability Injection tool 
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application. The interaction with the web application is 
always done from the web client’s point of view (the web 
browser) and the payload is applied to the variables (the 
text fields, combo boxes, etc, present in the web page 
interface). At the end of the attack, the Attack Injection 
tool assesses if the attack was successful. This success is 
equivalent to the “error” state in a traditional fault 
injection technique. We are not looking for the “failure” 
that may result from the attack. If an “error” can be 
injected it means the attack was effective. Obviously, the 
consequences of the attack (the “failure”) are dependent 
on the concrete situation and on how valuable is the data 
stored in the database. The detection of the success of the 
attack is done by searching for changes in the structure of 
the SQL query, showing the payload footprint. 
To exemplify a possible use of the Attack Injection 
tool we can evaluate an SQL Injection IDS. In this case, 
the IDS is placed between the DB proxy and the database, 
as seen in Figure 2. During the attack stage, when the IDS 
inspects the SQL query sent to the database, the Attack 
Injection tool also monitors the output of the IDS to 
identify if the attack has been detected by the IDS or not.  
The entire process is performed automatically, without 
human intervention. We just have to collect the final 
results of the Attack Injection tool, which also contains, 
in this case, the IDS detection output. 
In the next subsections, we describe the building 
blocks of the Vulnerability Injection and Attack Injection 
tools. 
 
3.1 Vulnerability Injection Tool 
 
The injection of vulnerabilities relies on data obtained 
by the field studies of vulnerabilities in LAMP web 
applications presented in [10, 21] and [11]. They refer to 
two of the most important vulnerability types in web 
applications, which are XSS and SQL Injection. An SQL 
Injection attack consists of tweaking the input fields of 
the web page (which can be visible or hidden) in order to 
alter the query sent to the backend database. This allows 
the attacker to retrieve sensible data or even alter database 
records. An SQL Injection attack can even be dormant for 
a while and be triggered by a specific event, such as the 
periodic execution of some procedures in the database 
(e.g., a scheduled database record cleaning function). A 
XSS attack consists of injecting HTML and/or a scripting 
language (usually Javascript) in a vulnerable web page. 
This attack type exploits the confidence a user has on the 
web site. The attack can affect other users of the web site, 
allowing the attacker to impersonate these users and even 
execute other types of attacks such as Cross Site Request 
Forgery (CSRF) [22]. The injection of XSS can also be 
persistent if the malicious string is stored in the backend 
database of the web application. 
What both XSS and SQL Injection vulnerability types 
have in common is the fact that they are the result of 
poorly coded applications that do not check properly their 
inputs. There are many possible ways to prevent these 
vulnerabilities, but a field study concludes that a large 
majority of them (about 3/4) is through the use of a 
filtering function [10]. This missing function in a 
vulnerable web application was classified into the three 
sub-types shown in Table 1. 
The list of possible types of vulnerabilities affecting 
web applications is enormous, but XSS and SQL 
Injection are at the top of that list, accounting for 32% of 
the vulnerabilities observed [1, 4]. Furthermore, SQL 
Injection is also responsible for some of the more severe 
results of attacks to web applications [6, 23, 24]. 
Nowadays, the most valuable asset of web applications is 
their back-end database. This is why the database is one 
of the main targets in web application attacks. For this 
reason, we have chosen to code first the SQL Injection 
type in our tools, although the XSS is quite similar in key 
aspects. 
Figure 3 shows the main components of the 
Vulnerability Injection Tool. It comprises components to 
search for included files, analyze variables and finally 
inject vulnerabilities. 
Figure 2: The attack stage of the Attack Injection tool 
 
Figure 3: Architecture of the Vulnerability Injection tool 
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The first component of the Vulnerability Injection 
Tool is the Dependency Builder. It searches recursively 
for the files that are included in the Input File, which is 
the target PHP file where we want to inject the 
vulnerabilities. In PHP programming, it is common to 
include a generic file inside another file, for reutilization 
purposes (this is done using one of the following 
statements: include(), include_once(), require(), 
require_once() [25]), what happens in many other 
programming languages. When the web application is 
running, the execution of the original file and its included 
files is processed by the PHP interpreter as a single block 
of code. When searching for possible situations where 
vulnerabilities may be injected, one should analyze the 
code in the same way the PHP interpreter does, thus the 
inclusion of this Dependency Builder component.  
The next component is the Variable Analyzer. 
Because XSS and SQL Injection vulnerabilities rely on 
vulnerable variables to be exploited, we have to analyze 
all the variables that influence SQL queries. This 
component gathers all the PHP variables from the source 
code and builds a mesh of dependencies related to each 
other. Then, it searches for PHP variables present in SQL 
query strings. Using the mesh created, the component can 
also determine all the variables that are indirectly 
responsible for the SQL query. Both variables that are 
directly and indirectly responsible for SQL Injection (or 
XSS, if it were the case) are considered valid. This is 
important because one variable may be used only as input 
(POST or GET HTTP parameters) and the result is passed 
to another variable that is the one that is going to be in the 
SQL query string. All the other variables are discarded. 
 Finally, the last component is the Vulnerability 
Injector. During the execution of this component, every 
location where the selected variables are found is tested 
with the conditions and restrictions of the Vulnerability 
Operators defined in [11], filtering those that are not 
applicable. The Vulnerability Injector component uses the 
Vulnerability Operator data and the result is the 
information about the mutation that has to be made in the 
source code in order to inject a particular vulnerability. 
Both the original source code and the mutated code 
(vulnerability injection code) are stored in the internal 
database of the Vulnerability Injection tool for future 
consumption (e.g. during the execution of the Attack 
Injection tool). 
In addition to working as an element of the Attack 
Injection tool, the Vulnerability Injection tool can also be 
used standalone (e.g. for the training of security teams 
[11]) and the immediate generation of the PHP files with 
vulnerabilities is also a feature built into this component. 
 
3.2 Attack Injection Tool 
 
We see the Attack Injection tool as an all in one 
application: it injects vulnerabilities into a web 
application and attacks them in a seamlessly manner. 
Therefore, the Attack Injection tool has the Vulnerability 
Injection tool integrated as a building block (Figure 4). 
The process of attacking an application consists of three 
stages: the Preparation, the Injection of Vulnerabilities 
and the Attack. The Preparation and the Injection of 
vulnerabilities are executed side by side, producing a set 
of results that will be used by the last stage, the Attack. 
During the Preparation stage, the web application is 
executed and the interaction is surveyed by the tool. This 
interaction can be made either manually, by someone 
executing every web application procedure, or 
automatically using an external tool, such as a Web 
Application Crawler, for example. During this 
interaction the HTTP communication protocol between 
the web browser and the web server and all the SQL 
communications going to and from the database server 
(MySQL in our prototype tool) are intercepted by the 
Attack Injection tool. 
This interception is accomplished using built in 
proxies specifically developed for the HTTP and for the 
SQL communications. These proxies send the entire 
packets data traversing them through the configured ports 
to the Attack Injection tool components HTTP 
Communication Analyzer and MySQL 
Communication Analyzer. Because these proxies run as 
independent processes and threads, they are relatively 
autonomous and asynchronous. To guarantee that they are 
perfectly synchronized with other components of the 
Attack Injection tool, a Sync mechanism was also built in 
(Figure 4). This allows, for example, matching the input 
interaction with the respective proxies’ results. 
  
Figure 4: Architecture of the Attack Injection tool 
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The information gathered by both proxies allows 
obtaining the structure of each web page, the associated 
input variables, typical values, and the associated SQL 
queries. During this interaction, the list of the web 
application files that are being run is also sent to the 
integrated Vulnerability Injection tool as input files. For 
each one, the Vulnerability Injection tool is executed, 
delivering the respective group of files with 
vulnerabilities already injected. Each of these files has 
only one vulnerability injected, i.e. the protection of that 
particular variable has been removed from the source 
code, following the Vulnerability Operator rules. 
Each one of these vulnerable variables must be 
attacked and for that purpose, the Attack Payload 
Generator creates a collection of attack payloads for 
every one of these files, according to characteristics of the 
target variable. These payloads intend to inject unwanted 
features in the queries sent to the database, therefore 
executing SQL Injection. They are based on a collection 
of basic attack strings presented in Table 2, but they may 
be extended, covering other cases, like those presented by 
Halfond et al. [26]. Every attack string is attached to the 
vulnerable variable trying to create some sort of text that 
can penetrate the breach produced by the injected 
vulnerability. Some tweaks are done to the payload 
strings, such as encode some parts using a URL encoding 
function. An attack footprint is also calculated that is 
expected to be seen in the query, if the attacked is 
successful.  This is the last step of the Preparation stage 
and the data generated is prepared to be used by the attack 
stage of the Attack Injection tool. 
The attack stage receives the files with vulnerabilities 
and the attack payloads from the previous stage. During 
the attack, every vulnerability is injected into the 
corresponding PHP file, one at a time. To prevent bias 
from previous attacks, before injecting any vulnerability, 
the web application files are copied from a safe location 
and the web application database is restored from a clean 
backup made before the start of the whole process. Using 
the generated attack payload, the web application is 
automatically attacked. While the attack is being 
performed, once again, the HTTP and SQL 
communications are intercepted by the respective proxies 
and results are analyzed and stored in the internal 
database by the HTTP Communication Analyzer and 
MySQL Communication Analyzer, as explained before. 
After the end of the attack, it is necessary to verify if it 
was successful or not. This is done by the Attack Success 
Detector component. The attack is successful if, as a 
result of the execution of the payload, the structure of the 
SQL query is altered [27]. This occurs when the payload 
footprint shows up in the query in specific conditions. We 
do not consider the cases where the payload footprint is 
placed inside a string variable of the SQL query, because 
usually a string can convey any combination of 
characters, numbers and signs. In the other cases, if it is 
possible to alter the structure of the query, then we have a 
successful SQL Injection attack. 
There is, however, one situation that can be 
misinterpreted by the Attack Injection tool. It occurs 
when the vulnerable variable value is processed by the 
web application code before being included in the SQL 
query. For example, if the input value is the full name of 
a person and the web application splits it into the name 
and surname; then the name and surname are going to be 
used in the SQL query in two different columns. This 
kind of processing cannot be detected correctly by the 
current implementation of the algorithm of the Attack 
Injection tool, therefore the attack payload footprint 
generated will be void. On the other hand, if the full name 
was used in the same query column the payload footprint 
will be fine. For this type of processing of the input 
variable, we have only implemented the situation where 
the processing done to the variable is changing the 
typesetter case of the value. Other common situations 
such as word separation, last name detection, etc, could 
also be easily implemented and added. 
One final remark about the Attack Injection tool is that 
it does not try to exploit the vulnerability in the sense of 
obtaining sensible information from the web application 
database. It only tries to evaluate whether some particular 
instance of the web application (depending on the 
vulnerability injected) is vulnerable to such attacks or not. 
The Attack Injection tool also makes the attacker SQL 
query string and the specific vulnerability exploited 
available. The output information given by the Attack 
Injection tool is the most important outcome and it is also 
the most relevant data for enterprises. This allows 
developers of the tools under assessment to upgrade them 
and correct the weaknesses discovered. 
 
4. Experimental results 
 
To evaluate the Attack Injection tool (and the 
Table 2.  Basic attack payload string examples 
Attack Payload 
Strings Expected result of the attack 
‘ Change in the structure of the query.  The 
query result is an error 
or 1=1 Change in the structure of the query. The 
query result is the override of the query 
restrictions 
‘ or ‘a’=’a Change in the structure of the query. The 
query result is the override of the query 
restrictions 
+connection_id()
-connection_id() Change in the query. The query result is 0 
+1-1 Change in the query. The query result is 0 
+67-ASCII('A') Change in the query. The query result is 0 
+51-ASCII(1) Change in the query. The query result is 0 
… … 
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integrated Vulnerability Injection tool) we have made 
three groups of experiments. In the first group, we 
injected vulnerabilities into three web applications to 
verify the quality of the vulnerabilities injected and the 
attack performance. In the second group, we tested an 
IDS for databases. The goal was to evaluate the efficiency 
of the IDS in detecting the attacks injected by the Attack 
Injection tool. In the final group of experiments, we 
evaluated two commercial Web Application Vulnerability 
Scanners regarding the detection of vulnerabilities that 
may be exploited for ad-hoc SQL Injection. In this 
situation, we tested the scanners with the vulnerabilities 
that could be attacked by the Attack Injector tool. 
For the evaluation experiments, we used LAMP 
(Linux, Apache, Mysql and PHP) web applications. The 
server runs Linux and the web server is Apache. This 
server hosts a PHP developed web application using a 
Mysql database. This topology of Operating System and 
software was chosen because it represents one of the most 
common technologies used to build custom web 
applications nowadays. 
We used three web applications as setup for the 
experiments. The first is the groupware/content 
management system TikiWiki [28]. It allows building 
wiki (a web site allowing users to contribute to it by 
adding and modifying its contents). It is widely used for 
building sites, such as the Official Firefox Support site 
and the KDE wiki. It was one of the finalists of the 
sourceforge.net 2007 for the most collaborative project 
award. 
The second web application used is the phpBB. It is a 
well-known LAMP web application and it has become 
the most widely used Open Source forum solution [29]. It 
is used by millions of users worldwide and won the 
sourceforge.net 2007 community choice awards for best 
project for communications. It is also the forum module 
that is integrated into the phpNuke content management 
and portal web application. For these two applications 
(TikiWiki and phpBB), in order to limit the quantity of 
data that we had to analyze, we bounded the attack 
surface only to the public sections. 
The last web application used is custom made and is 
called MyReferences. It consists of 13 PHP files and it is 
used to manage publications: it allows the storage of PDF 
documents, and some information about them such as the 
title, the conference, the year of publication, the 
document type, the relevance, and the authors. The 
information may be edited, queried and displayed. 
 
4.1 Vulnerabilities and attacks injected 
 
For this first experiment, we want to validate the 
ability of the Attack Injection tool in injecting 
vulnerabilities and also in exploiting them to attack web 
applications. Although this process is mostly automatic, it 
consists of the Preparation Stage, Vulnerability Injection 
Stage and Attack Stage. The Vulnerability Injection Stage 
is executed during the Preparation Stage (Figure 5). 
Step 3 of the process can be manual or use a web 
crawler. During the development of the Attack Injection 
tool we started by executing this stage interacting 
manually with the web application for internal testing and 
debugging purposes. However, in order to keep the same 
conditions for all the applications analyzed we did all the 
tests using a web crawler. There are several of them [30], 
but only some are able to insert values in the web 
application fields such as the WebSphinx. For this 
purpose, we can also use the crawlers built in the Web 
Application Vulnerability Scanners, which are usually 
very good in performing this task of web site exploration. 
The results of the attack injection in our target web 
applications are depicted in Table 3. The vulnerabilities 
injected represent all the MFCE SQL Injection type of 
vulnerabilities that can realistically be injected into the 
files used in the experiments. We must recall that these 
vulnerabilities must comply with a restrictive set of rules 
in order to be considered realistic. On average, the tool 
could inject one vulnerability for every 129 lines of PHP 
code. Given the small number of web applications 
analyzed, this number is merely informative and cannot 
be generalized. The tool took about 11 minutes in the 
attack stage of the TikiWiki web application, 12 minutes 
for the phpBB and 4 minutes for the MyReferences. 
For each vulnerability, we used several attack payloads 
and 38% of these attacks were successful. This measure 
of success comes from the presence of the payload 
footprint in the SQL queries sent to the database. For 
A
ttack Stage
9. Start the execution of the inspection daemons (the 
HTTP and MySQL proxies are deployed)
10. Inject a vulnerability
11. Start attack by sending every payload
12. Reset the MySQL database
13. Restore PHP files
14. Repeat the attack stage until every vulnerabilities 
have been injected
15. Calculate the attack success
16. Store attack results
Preparation
Stage
1. Reset the MySQL database
2. Start the execution of the inspection daemons (the 
HTTP and MySQL proxies are deployed)
3. Execute the web application (either manual or using an 
automatic crawler)
4. Stop inspection
5. Process and store the information generated during the 
execution of the web application
(*) Vulnerability Injection Stage
7. Reset the MySQL database
8. Generate attack payloads
(*)6. Inject the vulnerabilities executing the integrated 
Vulnerability Injection tool
Figure 5: Execution stages of the Attack Injection tool
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future work, we intend to deeply analyze the distribution 
of the attack payloads in the success of the attacks. We 
also want to test with other payload strings not yet 
included in Table 2 (see [26]), in order to improve the 
attack success rate. However, the current attack payloads 
were successful in 80% of the vulnerabilities injected. 
We analyzed, one by one, each injected vulnerability 
that was not successfully attacked, in order to understand 
the reason why the attack was not successful. In five 
situations of the edit_authors.php file belonging to the 
MyReferences web application the vulnerability is 
injected by removing an “intval()” PHP function. By 
removing this function it is expected that the variable 
could be attacked injecting string values, such as “ or 
1=1” (see Table 2 for more examples). However, the 
affected variables are used inside strings formatted with 
the “%d” format, which filters non-numeric variables. 
Therefore, this string formatting gives another level of 
protection preventing the attack through the target 
variable. In these situations, when the tool injects one 
vulnerability (by removing the code responsible for the 
sanitation of the variable) it leaves the other pieces of 
code still preventing the variable to be exploited. Recall 
that, even if multiple vulnerabilities can be injected in a 
file, we used only a single vulnerability injected at a time. 
This means that one variable with multiple overlapping 
checks cannot be attacked if one of the checks is missing, 
because the others are still active. It could be possible, 
however to inject more than one vulnerability at the same 
time in the same file, but we have no field study data that 
supports this kind of setup. 
All the other situations where it was not possible to 
attack the vulnerability, including those that affect the 
tiki-login.php of the TikiWiki web application, are the 
result of a mistake made by the Attack 
Injection tool. By coincidentally, the 
same variable used in a query is also 
used as a GET parameter in a form to 
send some information to the following 
web page. The Attack Injection tool was 
tricked by this second use of the 
variable and tried to inject a 
vulnerability in this latter place, which 
is of no effect to the SQL query (placed 
before in the source code sequence). 
The vulnerabilities that did not 
produce any successful attack represent 
only 11% of all the vulnerabilities 
injected. Except for the particular cases 
explained before, the results show that 
the tools are effective in providing a 
sufficient number of realistic 
vulnerabilities in a web application and 
that these vulnerabilities can be 
exploited to launch successful attacks. 
 
4.2 Case study 1: IDS evaluation 
 
One possible use for the Attack Injection tool is the 
evaluation of security counter measures, such as an IDS. 
In this situation, the IDS must be integrated with the 
Attack Injection tool, because the IDS output must be 
closely monitored during the attack stage, as was 
explained in Section 3. 
 For this case study, we used an IDS for databases 
[31]. It can deal with Oracle and MySQL databases, but 
we only needed the latter. This IDS implements the 
anomaly detection approach having itself a learning phase 
and a detection phase. Before the Attack Injection tool is 
initiated, we have to train the IDS with the target web 
application. For this phase, we used a web crawler to 
execute the web application functions. 
After the training phase of the IDS the Attack Injection 
tool can be configured to monitor the IDS output and 
operate with it. 
The results of these experiments for the three web 
applications are shown in Table 4. In this table, the most 
important columns are the last two: Successful Attacks 
and Detected IDS Attacks. As can be seen, this IDS could 
detect almost 99% of the attacks injected. Only five of 
them were not detected. We can also observe that, allied 
to the high detection rate of the IDS, there is also a high 
false positive rate. 
The Attack Injection tool does not only provide the 
results show in the Table 4. It can also show the exact 
HTTP attack code, the payload used, the query sent to the 
database, etc. With all this information developers and 
security managers can improve their tools and 
procedures. In this case study, a defective function in the 
Table 3. Web applications attack injection results 
Web 












tiki-editpage.php 904 3 84 34 3 
tiki-index.php 648 1 7 6 1 
tiki-login.php 305 3 21 0 0 
Total 1857 7 112 40 4 
phpBB 
search.php 1405 3 42 42 3 
login.php 224 1 21 21 1 
viewforum.php 694 1 7 7 1 
viewtopic.php 1210 5 84 84 5 
posting.php 1106 4 112 112 4 
Total 4639 14 266 266 14 
MyRefs 
edit_paper.php 310 27 525 61 20 
edit_authors.php 169 6 196 46 5 
Total 479 33 721 107 25 
 Grand total 6975 54 1099 413 43 
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IDS could easily be identified as responsible for the 
missing detections. In this function, there was one 
particular situation in processing the query structure that 
was not covered correctly. 
 
4.3 Case study 2: Web Application Vulnerability 
Scanners evaluation 
 
In this case study, we evaluate another type of security 
tool: Web Application Vulnerability Scanners. Web 
Application Vulnerability Scanners are commercial 
applications used to audit the web application security 
from the attacker’s point of view: they try to penetrate the 
web application as a black box, without having 
access to the source code. These scanners provide 
an easy and automatic way to search for 
vulnerabilities, avoiding the repetitive and tedious 
task of doing hundreds or even thousands of tests 
by hand for each vulnerability type. They can 
assess a myriad of security aspects such as XSS, 
SQL Injection, path traversal, file disclosure, web 
server vulnerabilities, etc. They use signatures of 
identified attacks to known web applications (and 
web application versions), but they can also test 
for ad-hoc XSS and SQL Injection. It is their 
ability to discover unreported SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities in web applications that we are 
going to test in this case study. 
We used the HP WebInspect 7.7 [32] and the 
IBM Watchfire AppScan 7.0 [33] scanners, which 
we randomly named them Scanner 1 and Scanner 
2. We have decided to keep the brand of the web 
vulnerability scanners anonymous to assure 
neutrality and because commercial licenses do not 
allow, in general, the publication of tool 
evaluation results. 
 The way the experiments are 
executed with the scanners is different 
from the IDS. In this case, we executed 
the Attack Injection tool in advance for 
the three target web applications so we 
can inject the collection of 
vulnerabilities that can be attacked 
successfully. Then, for each one of these 
vulnerabilities, we tested with both 
scanners (one at a time) and collected 
the results. Before every execution of 
the scanners, we reset the web 
application database to prevent bias 
from previous experiments. 
The results of the scanners test are 
shown in Table 5. The number of SQL 
Injection vulnerabilities detected by the 
scanners is minimal. They could only 
detect about 9% and 7% for the scanners 
1 and 2, respectively. Scanners heavily rely on the output 
of the web application (what the web browser sees) to 
detect a vulnerability, but the way web applications are 
built nowadays allows them to hide most of their error 
messages, making the task to identify this type of 
vulnerabilities really difficult for these scanners. As a 
result, we cannot rely only on these tools to assess the 
security of an ad-hoc web application. 
Although we did not test for XSS, we believe that the 
results would have been better, because many XSS issues 
are manifested in the client browser, where the scanner 
has access. However, for the second order type of XSS, 
where the attack string is stored in the database for latter 
Table 4. IDS evaluation results 
Web 












tiki-editpage.php 3 84 34 34 49 
tiki-index.php 1 7 6 6 1 
tiki-login.php 3 21 0 0 21 
Total 7 112 40 40 71 
phpBB 
search.php 3 42 42 42 0 
login.php 1 21 21 21 0 
viewforum.php 1 7 7 7 0 
viewtopic.php 5 84 84 84 0 
posting.php 4 112 112 112 0 
Total 14 266 266 266 0 
MyRefs 
edit_paper.php 27 525 61 61 294 
edit_authors.php 6 196 46 41 28 
Total 33 721 107 102 322 
 Grand total 54 1099 413 408 393 
Table 5. Web application vulnerability scanners results 
Web 













tiki-editpage.php 3 3 1 0 
tiki-index.php 1 1 0 0 
tiki-login.php 3 0 0 0 
Total 7 4 1 0 
phpBB 
search.php 3 3 0 1 
login.php 1 1 0 0 
viewforum.php 1 1 1 0 
viewtopic.php 5 5 1 1 
posting.php 4 4 0 0 
Total 14 14 2 2 
MyRefs 
edit_paper.php 27 20 1 0 
edit_authors.php 6 5 0 1 
Total 33 25 1 1 
 Grand total 54 43 4 3 
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deployment, the detection rate should also be along with 
the SQL Injection results. 
To improve the detection rate for the SQL Injection 
vulnerabilities, the scanners could use a similar approach 
to ours with the Attack Injection tool, using a probe in the 




In this paper, we propose a method to automatically 
inject realistic vulnerabilities and attacks in web 
applications, and present a set of tools that implement the 
proposed approach. Our approach provides an effective 
way to assess and improve security mechanisms related to 
web applications.  
We used a set of real-world case-studies to show the 
effectiveness of the tools to successfully inject and attack 
web applications, to test an IDS for SQL and to assess 
two commercial Web Application Vulnerability Scanners. 
The results show the effectiveness of the tools executing 
these assessment tasks. Furthermore, the results also lead 
to interesting conclusions about the mechanisms and tools 
under evaluation, showing that the tested IDS can detect 
practically all the attacks but with a high rate of false 
positives and that the vulnerability scanners do have 
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